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REPLY OR PERISH: THE FEDERAL RULE 83(A)(1)
PROBLEM WITH LOCAL RULES REQUIRING
RESPONSES TO 12(B)(6) MOTIONS
Alexis Pawlowski*
The federal courts of appeals are divided over whether district courts have
the legal authority to grant Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) motions
to dismiss solely for lack of reply pursuant to local rules requiring responses
to motions. Seven circuits hold that district courts must always consider the
merits of an unopposed Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. However, the First
and D.C. Circuits allow district courts to dismiss Rule 12(b)(6) motions for
lack of response pursuant to local rules in certain circumstances. The
majority view is that the use of these local rules in the First and D.C. Circuits
effectively shifts the Rule 12(b)(6) movants’ burden of proof onto the
nonmovant and thus violates Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 83(a)(1)’s
requirement of consistency between federal and local rules.
This Note examines this split and the federal and local rules issues
underlying the circuits’ diverging holdings. This Note then proposes a
bifurcated solution, implemented through either the adoption of a model
local rule or the interpretation of existing local rules as implicitly adopting
the solution. First, district courts may grant Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss
solely for lack of response pursuant to a local rule only when dismissed
without prejudice. However, when dismissing with prejudice, courts must
conduct an analysis of the underlying merits. This solution aims to bring
these local rules into compliance with Rule 83(a)(1) and give litigants and
courts alike uniform expectations when parties fail to respond to Rule
12(b)(6) motions to dismiss.
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INTRODUCTION
Plaintiffs Belva and Faith Webb filed their response in opposition to
defendant Joseph Morella’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)1 (“Rule 12(b)(6)”) one day
late and without a table of contents or table of authorities.2 The result was
severe. A federal district court in the Western District of Louisiana dismissed

1. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). This Note uses “12(b)(6) motions” to refer to motions to
dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6).
2. See Webb v. Morella, 457 F. App’x 448, 450 (5th Cir. 2012) (“The district court
granted the motion to dismiss as ‘unopposed’ under local rules, because the Webbs’ response
in opposition was one day late and did not contain a table of contents and a table of
authorities.”).
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the Webbs’ complaint with prejudice3 and awarded Morella $18,221.72 in
attorneys’ fees and costs.4 A dismissal with prejudice bars plaintiffs from
bringing suit on the claim again in the same federal court.5 The legal
authority for this draconian result was the Western District of Louisiana’s
Local Rule 7.5 (“Local Rule 7.5”),6 which provides, in relevant part, that “[i]f
the respondent opposes a motion, he or she shall file a response, including
opposing affidavits, memorandum, and such supporting documents as are
then available, within twenty-one days after service of the motion.”7 Further,
the memorandum “shall contain a concise statement of reasons in opposition
to the motion, and a citation of authorities upon which respondent relies.”8
The district court applied this rule, construing Morella’s 12(b)(6) motion as
“unopposed” and therefore granted Morella’s motion with prejudice without
considering the underlying merits of either Morella’s motion or the Webbs’
response.9
While the Webbs’ case is a particularly egregious example, federal district
courts’ use of similar local rules requiring responses to 12(b)(6) motions10 as
a way to dismiss “unopposed” motions—sometimes with prejudice and
without considering the underlying merits—is not a new phenomenon.11

3. See Webb v. Morella, No. 10-cv-01557, slip op. at 2 (W.D. La. Jan. 24, 2011)
(dismissing the Webbs’ complaint with prejudice), vacated, 457 F. App’x 448 (5th Cir. 2012).
4. See Webb, 457 F. App’x at 450.
5. See 9 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2373 (4th
ed. 2021) (“[A] Rule 41(b) dismissal on the merits for one of the grounds stated in that
provision only necessarily bars a plaintiff from refiling the same claim in the same federal
court, but not in other courts.”).
6. See Webb, No. 10-cv-01557, slip op. at 1–2 (explaining that plaintiffs’ complaint was
dismissed as unopposed with prejudice because the plaintiffs failed to file a timely opposition
response pursuant to the deadlines established by the requirements of Local Rule 7.5); Webb,
457 F. App’x at 452 (“The district court dismissed the Webbs’ complaint on the grounds that
it failed to comply with a local rule which ‘requir[es] parties who oppose motions to file
statements in opposition.’” (alteration in original) (quoting W.D. LA. R. 7.5)).
7. W.D. LA. R. 7.5.
8. Id.
9. See Webb, No. 10-cv-01557, slip op. at 2.
10. See Appendix. This Note will refer to local rules requiring a response to 12(b)(6)
motions as “compulsory-reply local rules.”
11. See, e.g., Marcure v. Lynn, No. 18-cv-03137, slip op. at 15–16 (C.D. Ill. Sept. 30,
2019) (dismissing plaintiff’s complaints with prejudice for failure to respond to a motion to
dismiss as required by Local Rule 7.1(B)(2)), rev’d, 992 F.3d 625 (7th Cir. 2021); Giummo
v. Olsen, No. 15-cv-3928, 2016 WL 5387649, at *4 (N.D. Ga. May 11, 2016) (denying a
motion to reconsider the granting of a motion to dismiss as unopposed pursuant to Local Rule
7.1(B) requiring a response), rev’d, 701 F. App’x 922 (11th Cir. 2017); Cohen v. Bd. of Trs.
of Univ. of D.C., 307 F.R.D. 287, 291 (D.D.C. 2014) (invoking Local Rule 7(b) to grant the
motion to dismiss on the ground that its merits were unopposed and thus conceded by plaintiff,
thereby dismissing plaintiff’s complaint and case with prejudice), aff’d in part, rev’d in part,
819 F.3d 476 (D.C. Cir. 2016); Shuey v. Schwab, No. 08-cv-1190, 2008 WL 4186208, at *2
(M.D. Pa. Sept. 9, 2008) (granting defendant’s motion to dismiss “without a merits analysis”
with prejudice because plaintiff failed to respond as required by Local Rule 7.6), vacated, 350
F. App’x 630 (3d Cir. 2009); ITI Holdings, Inc. v. Pro. Scuba Ass’n, No. 05-184-P-S, 2006
WL 240618, at *14–15 (D. Me. Jan. 31, 2006) (“This court has repeatedly granted motions to
dismiss when the plaintiff files no opposition. The First Circuit has upheld this practice. I see
no reason to deviate from that practice in this case.” (citations omitted)), report and
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Many district courts have their own “compulsory-reply local rules,”12 which,
read on their face, allow district courts to treat movants’ 12(b)(6) motions as
conceded because of their failure to respond.13 For example, the Central
District of Illinois’s Local Rule 7.1(B)(2)14 (“Local Rule 7.1(B)(2)”) requires
respondents to “file a response to the motion,” including a statement of the
specific points of law and supporting authorities on which the responding
party relies, within fourteen days after service of the movant’s motion and
memorandum.15 If the respondent fails to do so, the judge “will presume
there is no opposition to the motion and may rule without further notice to
the parties.”16
Compulsory-reply local rules are troubling because, based on their text
alone, they seem to permit district judges to grant 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss
with prejudice without analyzing the underlying merits of the motion.17
Thus, regardless of the equity of dismissal without any consideration of the
merits, this reading of compulsory-reply local rules violates Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 83(a)(1)18 (“Rule 83(a)(1)”) and the Rules Enabling Act19
because it permits a district judge to dismiss a lawsuit with prejudice based
solely on a complaint and a 12(b)(6) motion without any requirement to
consider the merits of the motion, as required by Rule 12(b)(6).20 Rule
83(a)(1) requires local rules to “be consistent with—but not duplicate—
federal statutes and rules.”21 Federal courts uniformly hold that, for 12(b)(6)
motions, the movant bears the burden of showing that dismissal of the claims
as alleged in the complaint is warranted.22 Any reading of compulsory-reply
local rules that allows the dismissal of complaints with prejudice without
consideration of the merits effectively shifts the burden of proof to the
recommendation adopted, No. 05-CV-184-P-S, 2006 WL 616069 (D. Me. Mar. 9, 2006), aff’d
sub nom. ITI Holdings, Inc. v. Odom, 468 F.3d 17 (1st Cir. 2006).
12. The appendix provides a list of federal compulsory-reply local rules and their relevant
text organized by circuit. See infra Appendix. The term “compulsory-reply local rules”
reflects that this type of local rule includes language explicitly requiring a response to motions.
Although all compulsory-reply local rules have a similar underlying requirement that
nonmovants file responses to 12(b)(6) motions, the language of individual rules varies widely
from district to district. To be clear, not all district courts have a compulsory-reply local rule,
but many do. Additionally, some compulsory-reply local rules require responses to other types
of motions in addition to 12(b)(6) motions. This Note will focus only on compulsory-reply
local rules’ interplay with Rule 12(b)(6).
13. See infra Appendix.
14. C.D. ILL. R. 7.1.
15. Id. 7.1(B)(2).
16. Id.
17. See cases cited supra note 11.
18. FED. R. CIV. P. 83(a)(1).
19. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071–2077.
20. See cases cited supra note 11.
21. FED. R. CIV. P. 83(a)(1).
22. See Marcure v. Lynn, 992 F.3d 625, 631 (7th Cir. 2021) (“While the text does not
discuss the burden of proof, every circuit court to address this issue—this Court included—
has interpreted Rule 12(b)(6) as requiring the movant to show entitlement to dismissal.”); 5B
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1357 (3d ed. 2021)
(“All federal courts are in agreement that the burden is on the moving party to prove that no
legally cognizable claim for relief exists.”).
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nonmovant because, if the nonmoving party fails to respond, the nonmoving
party will lose the case regardless of whether or not the movant has carried
the burden of showing that the dismissal for failure to state a claim is
warranted.23 Thus, to the extent compulsory-reply local rules effectively
shift this burden to the nonmovant, those rules are not consistent with Rule
12(b)(6) and are therefore invalid under Rule 83(a)(1).24
The fact that circuit courts currently disagree on whether district courts
can, pursuant to compulsory-reply local rules, grant a Rule 12(b)(6) motion
to dismiss with prejudice solely because the nonmovant fails to oppose it25
reflects the difficulty and ambiguity in interpreting and applying
compulsory-reply local rules.26 Seven circuits hold that district courts must
always consider the merits of an unopposed 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss
because Rule 12(b)(6) requires movants to prove entitlement to relief.27
However, the First Circuit has straightforwardly held that Rule 12(b)(6)’s
requirement can nevertheless be “overridden” by compulsory-reply local
rules in certain circumstances.28 According to the First Circuit, when a
district court grants an unopposed motion to dismiss pursuant to a
compulsory-reply local rule, it will “uphold the sanction.”29 However, the
D.C. Circuit has adopted a different approach and has specified that district
courts may only dismiss complaints pursuant to compulsory-reply local rules
if dismissed explicitly without prejudice.30 The majority view argues that
the First and D.C. Circuit holdings impermissibly ignore movants’ Rule
12(b)(6) burden to establish the complaint’s insufficiency and therefore
conflict with Rule 83(a)(1).31
In response to this circuit split, this Note proposes that courts, in the
context of 12(b)(6) motions, adopt a bifurcated solution implemented either
through the adoption of a model local rule or through a reinterpretation of
existing compulsory-reply local rules. First, where district courts, in their
discretion, grant unopposed 12(b)(6) motions with prejudice pursuant to
compulsory-reply local rules, district courts will conduct an independent
23. See Cohen v. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of D.C., 819 F.3d 476, 481 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (“To
the extent that it allows a district court to treat an unopposed motion to dismiss as conceded,
Local Rule 7(b) effectively places the burden of persuasion on the nonmoving party: when he
fails to respond, he loses. But Federal Rule 12(b)(6) places this burden on the moving party.”).
24. See Marcure, 992 F.3d at 632–33 (finding that the Central District of Illinois Local
Rule 7.1(B)(2) was invalid to the extent that it was used by the district court to dismiss claims
with prejudice solely because defendant’s motion was unopposed).
25. See Jean-Claude André et al., Seventh Circuit Weighs In on Circuit Split and
Concludes That Courts Cannot Grant Rule 12(b)(6) Motions to Dismiss Solely Because They
Are Unopposed, JD SUPRA (Apr. 7, 2021), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/seventhcircuit-weighs-in-on-circuit-1211718/ [https://perma.cc/5SPS-WTV8].
26. See Appendix.
27. See André et al., supra note 25.
28. See Marcure, 992 F.3d at 632 (explaining that the First Circuit “held that Rule
12(b)(6)’s requirement could nevertheless be overridden by local rules” (citing Pomerleau v.
W. Springfield Pub. Schs., 362 F.3d 143, 145 (1st Cir. 2004))).
29. See Pomerleau, 362 F.3d at 145.
30. See Cohen v. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of D.C., 819 F.3d 476, 480 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
31. See Marcure, 992 F.3d at 631.
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merits analysis to ensure the movant met its Rule 12(b)(6) burden of proof.
Second, district courts will grant unopposed 12(b)(6) motions without
conducting an analysis on the merits pursuant to compulsory-reply local rules
only when the motion is granted without prejudice. Because plaintiffs who
have their complaints dismissed without prejudice may file a new complaint
in the same court,32 the second prong of the solution balances Rule 83(a)(1)’s
consistency requirement with the necessary docket management function that
local rules play. For the second option, courts may consider exceptions when
parties demonstrate factors such as lack of bad faith, short delay, absence of
prejudice to the defendant, and efforts to respond. Ultimately, this solution
will bring compulsory-reply local rules into compliance with Rule 83(a)(1),
and litigants and courts alike will have one uniform and predictable set of
expectations when parties fail to respond to 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss.
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF LOCAL RULES AND FEDERAL RULE 12(B)(6)
The lawful scope of federal local rules and the requirements of Rule
12(b)(6) sit at the core of the current conflict among the circuit courts. Thus,
Part I will provide the necessary background on local rules and Rule 12(b)(6)
to contextualize both the circuit split and this Note’s solution. Specifically,
Part I.A will track the statutory authority for, and judicial review of, local
rules. Part I.B then will examine the procedural basics and standard of review
of Rule 12(b)(6).
A. Statutory Authority for and Judicial Review of Federal Local Rules
District courts wield great power to create local procedural rules that, if
valid, carry the force of law.33 Local rules are valid if they do not conflict
with the federal rules approved by the U.S. Supreme Court, U.S. Congress,
or the U.S. Constitution.34 Federal district courts derive their local
rulemaking authority from two sources: (1) the Rules Enabling Act and (2)
Rule 83(a)(1), which is itself a rule under the Rules Enabling Act.35 The
Rules Enabling Act provides that “all courts established by Act of Congress
may from time to time prescribe rules for the conduct of their business.”36
Further, Rule 83(a)(1) establishes that “a district court, acting by a majority
of its district judges, may adopt and amend rules governing its practice.”37
However, these same sources also limit district courts’ rulemaking
authority.38 The Rules Enabling Act requires that local rules be “consistent
32. See Semtek Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 505 (2001) (“The
primary meaning of ‘dismissal without prejudice,’ we think, is dismissal without barring the
plaintiff from returning later, to the same court, with the same underlying claim.” (quoting
FED. R. CIV. P. 41)).
33. See 12 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 22, § 3153.
34. See Contino v. United States, 535 F.3d 124, 126 (2d Cir. 2008).
35. FED. R. CIV. P. 83(a)(1).
36. 28 U.S.C. § 2071.
37. FED. R. CIV. P. 83(a)(1).
38. See Samuel P. Jordan, Local Rules and the Limits of Trans-Territorial Procedure, 52
WM. & MARY L. REV. 415, 432 (2010).

2022]

REPLY OR PERISH

1787

with Acts of Congress and rules of practice and procedure” prescribed under
the Act’s authority.39 Additionally, Rule 83(a)(1) mandates that local rules
“be consistent with—but not duplicate—the Federal Rules themselves.”40
Further, under the Rules Enabling Act, a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
may not “abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right.”41
District courts have made wide use of their Rule 83(a)(1) power.42
Thousands of local rules now exist on a wide range of topics and serve
significant roles within district courts.43 As Professor Stephen Subrin has
argued, local rules are necessary tools for overburdened court systems to
manage their dockets, especially with the number and complexity of federal
court cases rising dramatically.44 Accordingly, local rules are an important
and enduring aspect of modern-day federal litigation, but their proliferation
has been criticized.45
The exact burdens, review requirements, and means of enforcement that
Rule 83(a)(1)’s consistency requirement imposes on district court
rulemaking power remain unclear.46 Notably, since the 1938 promulgation
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Supreme Court has only
addressed the proper scope of local rules a handful of times.47 The Court’s
analysis begins in the 1960 case, Miner v. Atlass,48 which suggests that local
rules should not introduce “basic procedural innovations.”49 The Court held
that a local rule under which a district court ordered the taking of oral
depositions during discovery was not consistent with the General Admiralty

39. 28 U.S.C. § 2071(a).
40. FED. R. CIV. P. 83(a)(1).
41. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b).
42. See David M. Roberts, The Myth of Uniformity in Federal Civil Procedure: Federal
Civil Rule 83 and District Court Local Rulemaking Powers, 8 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 537,
538 (1985) (explaining that federal judges have “taken up their rulemaking power with an
enthusiasm that would astound the framers of Rule 83”).
43. See id. (explaining that, as of the source article’s publication in 1985, nearly 3000
local rules have been promulgated since Rule 83’s passage, and that “[i]n some districts, they
are now nearly as important as the federal rules themselves”).
44. See Stephen N. Subrin, Federal Rules, Local Rules, and State Rules: Uniformity,
Divergence, and Emerging Procedural Patterns, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1999, 2018 (1989) (“The
number of cases in the federal courts has risen dramatically, and cases may have become far
more complex than the drafters of the Federal Rules anticipated. Discovery and
documentation is often vast.” (footnote omitted)); Daniel R. Coquillette et al., The Role of
Local Rules, 75 A.B.A. J. 62, 65 (1989) (“Busy trial judges need more specificity to meet daily
problems and provide uniformity and predictability within their districts.”).
45. See Jordan, supra note 38, at 418 (“Hostility toward local rules is as old as the Federal
Rules themselves. Over the past seventy years, a steady stream of commentators and
committees has recommended that the role of local rules in the federal procedural structure be
reduced or eliminated.”).
46. See 12 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 22, § 3153.
47. See Jordan, supra note 38, at 417.
48. 363 U.S. 641 (1960).
49. Id. at 650 (calling for “exacting observance of the statutory procedures surrounding
the rule-making powers of the Court designed to insure that basic procedural innovations shall
be introduced only after mature consideration of informed opinion from all relevant quarters
with all the opportunities for comprehensive and integrated treatment which such
consideration affords.” (citations omitted)).

1788

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 90

Rules50 because the Court had already concluded that the discovery
deposition procedure was not authorized by the General Admiralty Rules
themselves.51
The Court characterized discovery by deposition as
“weighty,” “substantive,” and “complex.”52 Therefore, a district court could
not effectuate “a change so basic” through local rulemaking power.53 The
Court specified that its decision did not imply any “desirability or
undesirability” of the discovery deposition procedure in admiralty cases and
that Congress may amend the rule to allow it.54 However, the procedure was
simply not provided for in the General Admiralty Rules and therefore could
not be imposed by a local rule.55
The Supreme Court expanded on Rule 83(a)(1)’s consistency requirement
in the 1973 case Colgrove v. Battin.56 In Colgrove, the Court upheld a
District of Montana local rule that reduced the size of a civil jury from twelve
to six,57 despite Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4858 (“Rule 48”), which at
the time implicitly assumed a jury to have twelve members.59 In reconciling
the District of Montana’s local rule with Rule 48, the Court held that Rule
48’s twelve-person jury requirement was just an “assumption of the
draftsmen” that the Court could not read as an “implied direction”60 to
impanel twelve-person juries because a smaller jury could still effectively
fulfill its fact-finder role.61
In squaring Colgrove’s holding with the “basic procedural innovations”
standard set forth in Miner, the Court found that adjusting the number of
jurors was not a basic procedural innovation within the scope of Miner.62
The Colgrove Court reasoned that Miner’s reference to basic procedural
innovations referred only to “aspects of the litigatory process which bear
upon the ultimate outcome of the litigation.”63 Because the change in the
number of jurors pursuant to the local rule did not make a “discernible
difference” on the outcome of litigation, the local rule was valid.64 Professor
50. See id. at 641–42. This case arose before unification of admiralty and civil procedure,
when admiralty cases were governed by General Admiralty Rules, which included a similar
authority to adopt local rules. See 12 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 22, § 3153.
51. See Miner, 363 U.S. at 650.
52. Id. at 649–50.
53. Id. at 650.
54. Id. at 651.
55. See id. at 652.
56. 413 U.S. 149 (1973).
57. Id. 149–51.
58. See FED. R. CIV. P. 48; Paul D. Carrington, A New Confederacy?: Disunionism in the
Federal Courts, 45 DUKE L.J. 929, 950 (1996).
59. See 12 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 22, § 3153 n.50 (explaining that from 1938 to 1991,
Rule 48 was titled “Juries of Less Than Twelve-Majority Verdict” and read: “The parties may
stipulate that the jury shall consist of any number less than twelve or that a verdict or a finding
of a stated majority of the jurors shall be taken as the verdict or finding of the jury.”).
60. See Colgrove, 413 U.S. at 163.
61. See id. at 157 (finding that twelve members is not a substantive aspect of the right to
jury trial because the reliability of the jury as a fact-finder is not “a function of its size”).
62. See id. at 164 n.23.
63. See id.
64. See id.
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Paul D. Carrington has criticized Colgrove and its impact on local
rulemaking, arguing that the Supreme Court’s acceptance of such a radical
local rule allowed for rampant use of local rulemaking power.65 Overall,
Colgrove’s acceptance of the District of Montana’s six-person jury local rule
made it difficult for courts to determine exactly what factors might suffice to
invalidate a local rule under Rule 83(a)(1).66
To mitigate the seeming scope of local rulemaking power blessed by
Colgrove, the Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act67 revised the
Rules Enabling Act to place the burden on the circuit judicial councils to
review local rules.68 Notably, only a small number of judicial councils have
developed rigorous review standards up to par with Rule 83(a)(1) and the
Rules Enabling Act.69 Additionally, these standards’ onerous requirements
have impeded the review of many circuits with limited resources.70 As a
result, some academics have criticized the federal judiciary’s failure to
develop strong guidelines for district courts’ use of their Rule 83(a)(1)
rulemaking power.71
B. Federal Rule 12(b)(6) Motions to Dismiss
This section will provide background information on Rule 12(b)(6),
paying particular attention to how district courts analyze the sufficiency of a
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the movant’s burden of proof, and the difference
between a dismissal with or without prejudice. Rule 12(b)(6) states that a
litigant may file a motion to dismiss a complaint for “failure to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted.”72 When considering the motion to
dismiss, the court takes the complaint’s allegations as true,73 construes the
complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and draws all reasonable
inferences in favor of the pleader.74 A court’s Rule 12(b)(6) analysis focuses
65. See Carrington, supra note 58, at 950 (calling Colgrove an “epic blunder”).
66. See 12 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 22, § 3153.
67. Pub. L. No. 100-702, 102 Stat. 4642 (1988) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of the U.S.C.).
68. See 28 U.S.C. § 2071(c)(1) (“A rule of a district court prescribed under subsection (a)
shall remain in effect unless modified or abrogated by the judicial council of the relevant
circuit.”).
69. See Carl Tobias, Suggestions for Circuit Court Review of Local Procedures, 52 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. 359, 362 (1995).
70. See id. at 364–65 (explaining that Congress has not allotted sufficient funding for
councils to implement these standards and that the Ninth Circuit, which has an especially large
number of district courts, has had to rely on volunteer attorneys and law student interns).
71. See id. at 362 (“Unfortunately, very few circuit judicial councils in the twelve United
States Circuit Courts of Appeal have fully implemented the requirements relating to appellate
court oversight that are found in the 1985 amendment of Rule 83 or the 1988 JIA.”); Note,
Rule 83 and the Local Federal Rules, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1251, 1276 (1967) (“But courts have
failed to realize fully both the potentials and the limitations of Rule 83. They have not
attempted to determine the Rule’s proper place within the Federal Rules, and thus have not
evolved any meaningful guidelines for the use of the powers granted therein.”).
72. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6).
73. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 545 (2007) (explaining that courts
must conduct their Rule 12(b)(6) analysis assuming that the complaint’s allegations are true).
74. See 5B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 22, § 1357.
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on whether the allegations form a valid claim under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 8(a)(2), which requires a complaint to contain a “short and plain”
statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.75 Courts review the
complaint under the “plausibility” standard, where plaintiffs must plead facts
that plausibly show an entitlement to relief.76
The sufficiency of a complaint is a matter of law that the court can
determine on its own based on its reading of the complaint and the law, even
though parties are still given reasonable opportunities to respond to the
complaint.77 When a litigant presents a district court with a 12(b)(6) motion,
the court should, in theory, conduct a two-part analysis.78 First, the court
separates the factual and legal elements of the claim.79 The court may
disregard any legal conclusions but must accept all “well-pleaded facts” as
true.80 Second, the court determines whether the facts alleged in the
complaint are sufficient to show that the plaintiff has a plausible claim for
relief.81 Making this determination is “context-specific” and requires courts
to draw on their “experience and common sense.”82 In deciding a motion to
dismiss, courts must usually limit their analysis to the four corners of the
complaint.83 However, courts may consider documents attached to the
complaint as exhibits or incorporated by reference into the complaint.84 For
instance, the Second Circuit has upheld district courts’ consideration of the
full text of documents partially quoted in the complaint,85 of a contract
between parties integral to the complaint alleging breach,86 and of documents
integral to the complaint relied upon by a plaintiff in drafting a complaint.87
Although not in the text of Rule 12(b)(6), federal courts agree that, for
12(b)(6) motions, the moving party carries the burden to prove that the
nonmoving party failed to plead a legally cognizable claim for relief.88 For
instance, in Mediacom Southeast LLC v. BellSouth Telecommunications,
75. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2).
76. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
77. See McCall v. Pataki, 232 F.3d 321, 322 (2d Cir. 2000).
78. See Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210–11 (3d Cir. 2009).
79. See id.
80. See id.
81. See id. at 211.
82. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009).
83. See Maniolos v. United States, 741 F. Supp. 2d 555, 560 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), aff’d, 469
F. App’x 56 (2d Cir. 2012).
84. See id.; Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc., 282 F.3d 147, 153 (2d Cir. 2002) (“[A]
plaintiff’s reliance on the terms and effect of a document in drafting the complaint is a
necessary prerequisite to the court’s consideration of the document on a dismissal motion;
mere notice or possession is not enough.”); Rothman v. Gregor, 220 F.3d 81, 88 (2d Cir. 2000)
(deeming a complaint to include “any written instrument attached to it as an exhibit or any
statements or documents incorporated in it by reference”).
85. See San Leandro Emergency Med. Grp. Profit Sharing Plan v. Philip Morris Cos., 75
F.3d 801, 808–09 (2d Cir. 1996).
86. See Int’l Audiotext Network, Inc. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 62 F.3d 69, 72
(2d Cir. 1995).
87. See Cortec Indus., Inc. v. Sum Holding L.P., 949 F.2d 42, 47–48 (2d Cir. 1991).
88. See Marcure v. Lynn, 992 F.3d 625, 631 (7th Cir. 2021); 5B WRIGHT ET AL., supra
note 22, § 1357.
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Inc.,89 the Sixth Circuit reversed the district court’s decision placing the
12(b)(6) burden of proof on the nonmoving party.90 There, the court found
that the district court improperly considered the persuasiveness of the
nonmoving party’s allegations and whether there were any genuine issues of
material fact, rather than merely accepting the allegations as true and
evaluating whether there was a cognizable claim in the complaint.91 Many
federal courts have reached similar conclusions on this issue.92
A substantial amount of case law reflects that the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure themselves have a policy preference for resolution of disputes on
the merits,93 especially when courts dismiss with prejudice.94 Courts have
invoked this pro-merits policy when deciding on 12(b)(6) motions, especially
when determining whether to grant a motion with or without prejudice.95
However, in determining whether to dismiss with prejudice, circuit courts
have also permitted district courts to consider factors such as a litigant’s
refusal to abide by court deadlines,96 bad faith, short delay, absence of
prejudice to the defendant, and a plaintiff’s efforts to respond.97
Whether a court grants a 12(b)(6) motion with or without prejudice has
important implications for litigants.98
12(b)(6) motions operate as
adjudications on the merits—in other words, with prejudice99—unless the

89. 672 F.3d 396 (6th Cir. 2012).
90. See id. at 399 (explaining that “[o]n a motion to dismiss, AT&T, the moving party,
bore the burden, not the non-moving party, Mediacom”).
91. See id.
92. See, e.g., Cohen v. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of D.C., 819 F.3d 476, 481 (D.C. Cir. 2016)
(“Rule 12(b)(6) places this burden on the moving party.”); Kundratic v. Thomas, 407 F. App’x
625, 627 (3d Cir. 2011) (“The defendant bears the burden of proving the plaintiff has failed to
articulate a claim upon which relief could be granted.”); Spirit Lake Tribe v. Jaeger,
No. 18-cv-222, 2020 WL 625279, at *8 (D.N.D. Feb. 10, 2020) (“The burden is on the moving
party to prove that no legally cognizable claim for relief exists.”).
93. See, e.g., Krupski v. Costa Crociere S. p. A., 560 U.S. 538, 550 (2010) (explaining
that the Federal Rules have a general preference for resolution of disputes on the merits);
Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 514 (2002) (“The liberal notice pleading of Rule
8(a) is the starting point of a simplified pleading system, which was adopted to focus litigation
on the merits of a claim.”); 5B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 22, § 1357.
94. See Rudder v. Williams, 666 F.3d 790, 794 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (“Dismissal with
prejudice is the exception, not the rule, in federal practice because it ‘operates as a rejection
of the plaintiff’s claims on the merits and [ultimately] precludes further litigation of them.’”
(alteration in original) (quoting Belizan v. Hershon, 434 F.3d 579, 583 (D.C. Cir. 2006))).
95. See, e.g., Cohen, 819 F.3d at 482 (explaining that granting an unopposed 12(b)(6)
motion to dismiss “risks circumventing the clear preference of the Federal Rules to resolve
disputes on their merits”); Partridge v. Two Unknown Police Officers of Hous., 791 F.2d 1182,
1189 (5th Cir. 1986) (granting leave to amend a 12(b)(6) motion as “guided by the policy of
the federal rules favoring adjudication on the merits”).
96. See Boazman v. Econ. Lab’y, Inc., 537 F.2d 210, 212 (5th Cir. 1976).
97. See Cohen, 819 F.3d at 484.
98. See 9 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 5, § 2373 (“In the context of determining the effect
of a Rule 41(b) dismissal on a second action based on the same claim, the distinction between
a dismissal with prejudice and one without prejudice is significant.”).
99. See id. (“[B]ecause an involuntary dismissal is an adjudication on the merits, it is, in
the words commonly used by the federal courts, ‘with prejudice.’”).
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court specifies otherwise in its order of dismissal.100 This is because Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) (“Rule 41(b)”) states that certain dismissals,
specifically, those for lack of jurisdiction, improper venue, and failure to join
an indispensable party, are presumed to not be on the merits.101 Therefore,
all other dismissals, including dismissals for failure to state a claim under
Rule 12(b)(6), operate as adjudications on the merits unless the court states
otherwise.102 A dismissal without prejudice means that the plaintiff may file
a new complaint in the same court.103 On the other hand, a dismissal with
prejudice, in the context of 12(b)(6) motions, bars a plaintiff from refiling the
same claim in the same federal court but not in other courts.104
II. THREE APPROACHES TO WHETHER COURTS MAY GRANT 12(B)(6)
MOTIONS PURSUANT TO COMPULSORY-REPLY LOCAL RULES
As compulsory-reply local rules have proliferated,105 courts have
struggled to determine where and how they interact with Rule 12(b)(6)’s
mechanics and Rule 83(a)(1)’s consistency requirement.106 The circuit
courts disagree over whether district courts may rely on compulsory-reply
local rules to grant 12(b)(6) motions solely because the motions are
unopposed.107 Nine circuit courts have addressed this split, and three distinct
approaches have developed.108 Seven of the circuits require movants to
always prove entitlement to relief, even when the nonmoving party does not
respond as required by local rule.109 The First Circuit, on the other hand, has
held that district courts’ obligation to examine the merits of the complaint
itself could “nevertheless be overridden by local rules,”110 thus empowering
district courts to grant motions to dismiss as unopposed pursuant to
compulsory-reply local rules.111 Alternatively, the D.C. Circuit takes a
“middle approach,” where district courts may grant a motion to dismiss
solely on the basis that the nonmovant fails to oppose, but only without
prejudice.112
100. See id. (“[A] dismissal under Rule 41(b) or any other dismissal not provided for in
Rule 41, including a default judgment, will operate as an adjudication on the merits.”).
101. See FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b).
102. Id.; see 9 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 5, § 2373.
103. See 9 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 5, § 2373.
104. See Semtek Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 506 (2001) (explaining
that the effect of the “adjudication upon the merits” default provision of Rule 41(b) “is simply
that, unlike a dismissal ‘without prejudice,’ the dismissal in the present case barred refiling of
the same claim” in the same district court).
105. See infra Appendix.
106. See André et al., supra note 25.
107. See id.
108. See id.
109. See Marcure v. Lynn, 992 F.3d 625, 631 (7th Cir. 2021) (“Of the eight circuit courts
to consider this issue, six have held that courts may not grant Rule 12(b)(6) motions solely
because they are unopposed.”).
110. Id. at 632.
111. See Pomerleau v. W. Springfield Pub. Schs., 362 F.3d 143, 145 (1st Cir. 2004).
112. Marcure, 992 F.3d at 631 (“The D.C. Circuit takes a middle approach and ‘reluctantly’
permits courts to grant Rule 12(b)(6) motions on this basis—but only if the court does so
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Thus, as courts have grappled with compulsory-reply local rules, a variety
of judicial approaches have emerged. In the following sections, this Note
tracks the three approaches circuit courts have taken to this issue. Part II.A
surveys the majority view, focusing especially on the Seventh Circuit’s
recent decision in Marcure v. Lynn.113 Part II.B explains the First Circuit’s
opposing rule and examines the justifications for its conflicting
jurisprudence. Part II.C investigates the D.C. Circuit’s “middle approach”
and demonstrates how it stands apart from both the majority and First
Circuit’s approach to granting 12(b)(6) motions.
A. Majority Approach: Courts May Not Dismiss Solely for Lack of
Response Pursuant to Local Rule
The Second,114 Third,115 Fifth,116 Sixth,117 Seventh,118 Tenth,119 and
Eleventh120 Circuits agree that district courts must address the merits of a
defendant’s 12(b)(6) motion and may not dismiss a complaint solely on the
ground that a plaintiff failed to respond pursuant to a compulsory-reply local
rule.
The Seventh Circuit most recently weighed in on this issue in Marcure v.
Lynn.121 There, the Seventh Circuit held that Rule 12(b)(6) prevents courts
from granting unopposed motions to dismiss solely because the nonmovant
failed to respond as required by local rule.122 A federal district court in the
Central District of Illinois had granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss with
prejudice because the plaintiff failed to file a response, as required by the
Central District of Illinois’s Local Rule 7.1(B)(2).123 On appeal, the Seventh
without prejudice.” (quoting Cohen v. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of D.C., 819 F.3d 476, 480 (D.C.
Cir. 2016))).
113. 992 F.3d 625 (7th Cir. 2021).
114. See McCall v. Pataki, 232 F.3d 321, 323 (2d Cir. 2000) (“The district court in the
present case did not address the merits of defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6) motion and appears to
have dismissed the complaint solely on the ground that Herrera did not respond to the motion.
Dismissal on that basis was error.”).
115. See Stackhouse v. Mazurkiewicz, 951 F.2d 29, 30 (3d Cir. 1991) (holding dismissal
without a merits analysis improper when based solely on noncompliance with a local rule
requiring responses to motions).
116. See Webb v. Morella, 457 F. App’x 448, 452 n.4 (5th Cir. 2012); Ramsey v. Signal
Delivery Serv., Inc., 631 F.2d 1210, 1214 (5th Cir. 1980).
117. See Carver v. Bunch, 946 F.2d 451, 453 (6th Cir. 1991) (“Interpreting Local Rule
6(b)(1)(A) as authorizing a district court to dismiss Carver’s complaint would seemingly make
that rule inconsistent with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”).
118. See Marcure v. Lynn, 992 F.3d 625, 631–32 (7th Cir. 2021).
119. See Issa v. Comp USA, 354 F.3d 1174, 1178 (10th Cir. 2003) (“Consequently, even
if a plaintiff does not file a response to a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the
district court must still examine the allegations in the plaintiff’s complaint and determine
whether the plaintiff has stated a claim upon which relief can be granted.”).
120. See Giummo v. Olsen, 701 F. App’x 922, 925 (11th Cir. 2017) (“[T]he district court
must address the merits of the defendants’ motion to dismiss.”).
121. See Marcure, 992 F.3d at 631; see also André et al., supra note 25.
122. See Marcure, 992 F.3d at 631.
123. See id. at 628. The Central District of Illinois’s Local Rule 7.1(B)(2) requires that any
party opposing a motion must file a response to the motion within fourteen days after the
service of the motion and memorandum, including “a brief statement of the specific points or
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Circuit rejected the district court’s application of Local Rule 7.1(B)(2)
because Rule 12(b)(6) puts the burden on the moving party to prove that no
claim exists.124 The Seventh Circuit found that the district court’s use of
Local Rule 7.1(B)(2) was invalid under Rule 83(a)(1)’s consistency
requirement because the district court’s use of Local Rule 7.1(B)(2)
effectively placed the burden of proof on the nonmovant.125 Instead, the
Seventh Circuit held that district courts must rule on unopposed 12(b)(6)
motions by reaching the merits, instead of granting the motion solely because
the nonmovant failed to oppose.126 The court emphasized that district courts
could rule on a 12(b)(6) motion even absent a response by looking to the
complaint to determine the sufficiency of the pleadings.127 The court read
this requirement into the text of Local Rule 7.1(B)(2) itself.128 The Seventh
Circuit explicitly mentioned the First and D.C. Circuits’ respective holdings
on this issue and dismissed their reasoning as not persuasive.129 Other
circuits have come to similar conclusions as the Marcure court.130
The Seventh Circuit leaned heavily on its prior Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 56131 (“Rule 56”) motion for summary judgment cases, explaining
that this line of case law was “analogous” because both Rule 56 and Rule
12(b)(6) impose the same requirement that movants prove their entitlement
to relief.132 The Marcure court cited its own prior case where it held that
Rule 56 “imposes an affirmative obligation” of proof on the movant because
Rule 56’s text requires the movant to show that it is entitled to judgment as
a matter of law.133 On one hand, the court recognized that Rule 12(b)(6)’s
text, unlike Rule 56’s text, does not expressly assign the burden of proof to
the movant.134 However, the court noted that federal courts have read a
similar burden of proof into Rule 12(b)(6).135 Therefore, the court found that

propositions of law and supporting authorities upon which the responding party relies.” C.D.
ILL. R. 7.1(B)(2). Further, if no response is filed by the deadline, the “judge will presume
there is no opposition to the motion and rule without further notice to the parties.” Id.
124. See Marcure, 992 F.3d at 631.
125. See id. at 632.
126. See id.
127. See id. at 633 n.5.
128. See id. at 632 (“We note first that the text of the local rule does not require or expressly
authorize courts to grant a motion solely because there is no response filed.”).
129. See id. at 631–32 (“Neither the First Circuit nor the officers square this logic with
Rule 83(a)(1), which provides that local rules ‘must be consistent with’ the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. We thus reject the First Circuit’s approach in favor of the majority view,
which has the sounder reading of the federal rules and more closely aligns with our own
treatment of Rule 12(b)(6).” (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 83(a)(1))).
130. See id. at 631 (“The majority of circuit courts have made explicit what our precedent
implies.”).
131. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a) (“The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows
that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law. The court should state on the record the reasons for granting or denying
the motion.”).
132. See Marcure, 992 F.3d at 631.
133. See id. (citing Raymond v. Ameritech Corp., 442 F.3d 600, 608 (7th Cir. 2006)).
134. See Marcure, 992 F.3d at 631.
135. See id.
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it should treat the dispositions of unopposed Rule 56 and Rule 12(b)(6)
motions equally because, under both rules, the movant has an “identical
requirement” to prove entitlement to relief.136 Thus, the court held that the
logic of Rule 56 applied to Rule 12(b)(6) and that 12(b)(6) movants were also
obligated to prove entitlement to relief.137 For these reasons, the Seventh
Circuit ultimately joined the majority in holding that district courts may not
grant 12(b)(6) motions solely for lack of opposition pursuant to their
compulsory-reply local rules.138
B. The First Circuit’s Outlier Approach: Courts May Dismiss 12(b)(6)
Motions Solely for Lack of Response Pursuant to Local Rule
Unlike the majority of circuits described above, the First Circuit has held
that district courts have the discretion to dismiss an action because of a
party’s failure to respond to a motion when a response is required by a local
rule.139 The First Circuit has emphasized that district courts may insist on
strict compliance with their local rules.140 On one hand, the court has
acknowledged Rule 12(b)(6)’s requirement that district courts examine the
complaint and determine whether it sufficiently states a claim.141 However,
despite acknowledging that Rule 12(b)(6) itself does not require a response
to a motion, the court has expressly stated that when a local rule requires a
response to a motion, the nonmoving party is placed on notice that failure to
respond may result in procedural default.142 In other words, if the
nonmoving party fails to respond, the nonmoving party forfeits the
opportunity to contest the motion to dismiss.143 According to the court, in
136. See id. (“Both rules thus impose the same requirement—movants must prove
entitlement to relief. The officers proffer no explanation for why the disposition of unopposed
motions under these two rules ought to differ despite that identical requirement.”).
137. See id.
138. See id.
139. See NEPSK, Inc. v. Town of Houlton, 283 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2002) (“[I]t is within the
district court’s discretion to dismiss an action based on a party’s unexcused failure to respond
to a dispositive motion when such response is required by local rule, at least when the result
does not clearly offend equity.”); see also Pinto v. Universidad de Puerto Rico, 895 F.2d 18,
19 n.1 (1st Cir. 1990) (expressly distinguishing compulsory-reply local rules from the First
Circuit’s general rule that courts may not take failure to respond to a motion as a default).
140. See NEPSK, 283 F.3d at 7 (“A district court simply may insist upon compliance with
its local rules.” (quoting United States v. Proceeds of Sale of 3,888 Pounds of Atl. Sea
Scallops, 857 F.2d 46, 49 (1st Cir. 1988))); Air Line Pilots Ass’n v. Precision Valley Aviation,
Inc., 26 F.3d 220, 224 (1st Cir. 1994) (“District courts enjoy broad latitude in administering
local rules. In the exercise of that discretion, district courts are entitled to demand adherence
to specific mandates contained in the rules.” (citation omitted)); United States v. Roberts, 978
F.2d 17, 20 (1st Cir. 1992) (“A district court possesses great leeway in the application and
enforcement of its local rules.”); Mendez v. Banco Popular de Puerto Rico, 900 F.2d 4, 7 (1st
Cir. 1990) (“Rules are rules—and the parties must play by them.”).
141. See Pomerleau v. W. Springfield Pub. Schs., 362 F.3d 143, 145 (1st Cir. 2004).
142. See id. (explaining that where a local rule expressly requires a response to a motion,
“the local rule provides the basis for dismissal rather than [Rule] 12(b)(6), which does not on
its own terms require a response to a motion to dismiss”). In other words, if a complainant
fails to respond to a 12(b)(6) motion, the court may dismiss the case pursuant to a
compulsory-reply local rule.
143. See id. at 146–47.
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these cases, the local rule, and not Rule 12(b)(6), would provide the basis for
dismissal, even though Rule 12(b)(6) itself does not expressly require a
response.144 For example, in Pomerleau v. West Springfield Public
Schools,145 the First Circuit held that “where a district court grants an
unopposed motion to dismiss pursuant to a local rule that requires a
response,” it would uphold the dismissal.146
In ITI Holdings, Inc. v. Odom,147 the First Circuit’s most recent case to
address this issue, the First Circuit upheld the District of Maine’s use of its
Local Rule 7(b)148 to grant a Rule 12(b)(6) motion as unopposed149 with
prejudice.150 The District of Maine’s Local Rule 7(b) provides that “[u]nless
within twenty-one days after the filing of a motion, the opposing party files
written objection thereto, incorporating a memorandum of law, the opposing
party shall be deemed to have waived objection.”151 The district court
entered judgment for the movant because the form of the nonmovant’s
response to the 12(b)(6) motion was insufficient as the movant filed it as a
motion to transfer rather than an objection.152
The nonmovant unsuccessfully argued that the district court abused its
discretion in automatically granting the motion as unopposed pursuant to the
District of Maine’s Local Rule 7(b) without considering the standard
governing the granting of 12(b)(6) motions.153 The nonmovant argued that
the First Circuit should extend to Rule 12(b)(6) its Rule 56 case law which
holds that courts cannot grant a summary judgment motion based solely on
the opposing party’s failure to respond to the motion.154 In rejecting this
argument, the First Circuit differentiated Rule 56 and Rule 12(b)(6),
concluding that Rule 12(b)(6) lacks Rule 56’s explicit language requiring
courts to deny a Rule 56 motion even if unopposed where supporting
evidence does not establish the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.155
The First Circuit held that “[n]othing in [Rule 12(b)(6)’s] text compels the
court to apply any particular standard in deciding whether to grant or deny a
motion.”156 Therefore, the district court’s “strict enforcement” of the District
144. See id.
145. 362 F.3d 143 (1st Cir. 2004).
146. See id. at 145.
147. 468 F.3d 17 (1st Cir. 2006).
148. D. ME. R. 7(b).
149. See ITI Holdings, 468 F.3d at 18.
150. See ITI Holdings, Inc. v. Pro. Scuba Ass’n, No. 05-184-P-S, 2006 WL 240618, at *2,
*14 (D. Me. Jan. 31, 2006) (dismissing a complaint “on the merits” because the plaintiff had
“not filed any opposition to the defendants’ motion to dismiss”), report and recommendation
adopted, No. 05-184-P-S, 2006 WL 616069 (D. Me. Mar. 9, 2006), aff’d sub nom. ITI
Holdings, Inc. v. Odom, 468 F.3d 17 (1st Cir. 2006).
151. D. ME. R. 7(b).
152. See ITI Holdings, 468 F.3d at 18.
153. See id.
154. See id.
155. See id.; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 56 (“The court shall grant summary judgment if the
movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law.”).
156. See ITI Holdings, 468 F.3d at 19.
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of Maine’s Local Rule 7(b) created no impermissible conflict with Rule
12(b)(6).157 For these reasons, the First Circuit breaks from the majority of
circuits and holds that district courts may dismiss complaints for failure to
state a claim pursuant to compulsory-reply local rules solely for lack of
reply.158
C. The D.C. Circuit’s “Reluctant” Middle Approach: Courts May Grant
12(b)(6) Motions Without Prejudice
The D.C. Circuit has taken a middle approach and “reluctantly” held that
the District Court for the District of Columbia may, pursuant to a
compulsory-reply local rule, treat a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss as unopposed
and dismiss the plaintiff’s claim as conceded, but only if the court dismisses
the claim without prejudice.159 The District Court for the District of
Columbia’s Local Rule 7(b) (“D.C. Rule 7(b)”) provides: “Within 14 days
of the date of service . . . an opposing party shall serve and file a
memorandum of points and authorities in opposition to the motion. If such
a memorandum is not filed within the prescribed time, the Court may treat
the motion as conceded.”160 The D.C. Circuit has described D.C. Rule 7(b)
as “a docket-management tool” that “facilitates efficient and effective
resolution of motions”161 and has indicated that its enforcement ensures that
“litigants argue their causes on a level playing field.”162 The D.C. Circuit
has also held that D.C. Rule 7(b) applies where a party files a response in
opposition to a motion but only addresses some of the arguments raised in
the movant’s motion.163 In that case, district courts may treat the
unaddressed arguments as conceded.164
In Cohen v. Board of Trustees of the University of the District of
Columbia,165 the D.C. Circuit upheld the district court’s dismissal of the
plaintiff’s complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) since “its merits were unopposed
and thus conceded by [the plaintiff]” because the plaintiff missed D.C. Rule
7(b)’s reply deadline.166 However, the D.C. Circuit held that the district
court’s dismissal of the claim with prejudice was an abuse of discretion.167
Instead, the D.C. Circuit required the district court to consider alternative,
less harsh sanctions, such as dismissal without prejudice, before granting
motions to dismiss because of a plaintiff’s failure to respond.168
157. Id.
158. See id.
159. See Cohen v. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of D.C., 819 F.3d 476, 484 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
160. D.D.C. R. 7(b).
161. Fox v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 389 F.3d 1291, 1294 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
162. See Texas v. United States, 798 F.3d 1108, 1114 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (quoting Fox, 389
F.3d at 1295).
163. See id.
164. See id.
165. 819 F.3d 476 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
166. See id. at 478; see also D.D.C. R. 7(b).
167. See Cohen, 819 F.3d at 478.
168. See id. at 483 (requiring consideration of “less harsh alternatives before granting a
dispositive motion based on the plaintiff’s procedural failure”).
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The court directly addressed the First Circuit’s contradictory line of cases,
noting that the First Circuit found no conflict between the District of Maine’s
version of D.C. Rule 7(b) and Rule 12(b)(6).169 The D.C. Circuit
differentiated itself from the First Circuit by holding that D.C. Rule 7(b)
stands in tension with Rule 12(b)(6).170 The D.C. Circuit also noted that D.C.
Local Rule 7(b) may violate Rule 83(a)(1) because, in effect, it puts the
burden of proof on the nonmoving party.171 Additionally, the court
recognized that D.C. Rule 7(b) allows the district court to dismiss cases
without analyzing their merits and therefore conflicts with the “weighty
preference” for deciding cases on the merits for case-dispositive motions
under Rule 12(b)(6).172 Although the court expressed these concerns about
its holding,173 it was bound by precedent where it had previously upheld the
district court’s use of D.C. Rule 7(b) to grant unopposed 12(b)(6) motions
with prejudice.174
In so holding, the Cohen court principally relied on its former case Fox v.
American Airlines, Inc.,175 which also addressed D.C. Rule 7(b) as applied
to Rule 12(b)(6).176 In Fox, the D.C. Circuit upheld a “straightforward
application” of D.C. Rule 7(b) where the district court granted a motion to
dismiss because the defendant failed to reply.177 The Fox court also rejected
the plaintiff’s argument that it should vacate the district court’s judgment
because the plaintiff failed to receive electronic notice of the defendant’s
motion to dismiss.178 The court reasoned that if the plaintiff had checked the
court’s docket, the plaintiff would have discovered the defendant’s
motion.179 For these reasons, the D.C. Circuit has ultimately taken a middle
approach to this circuit split and allows dismissal solely for lack of reply
pursuant to a compulsory-reply local rule, but only when granted without
prejudice.180
III. A MODERATE SOLUTION: A BIFURCATED READING OF
COMPULSORY-REPLY LOCAL RULES
To simplify and unify the approaches courts have taken on this circuit
split,181 courts should, in the context of 12(b)(6) motions, implement a
bifurcated solution to interpret compulsory-reply local rules. The solution is
169. See id.
170. See id. at 482. There is no meaningful difference between the language of D. ME. R.
7(b) and D.D.C. R. 7(b). See Appendix.
171. See Cohen, 819 F.3d at 481.
172. See id. at 483.
173. See id. (“[T]his use of [D.C.] Rule 7(b) in a way that seems to undermine the Federal
Rules’ protections is troubling.”).
174. See id. at 480–81.
175. 389 F.3d 1291 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
176. See Cohen, 819 F.3d at 483.
177. See Fox, 389 F.3d at 1294–95.
178. See id. at 1293.
179. See id.
180. See Cohen, 819 F.3d at 480.
181. See supra Part II.
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“bifurcated” because district courts should take different procedural routes
depending on whether the court grants the unopposed 12(b)(6) motion with
or without prejudice. First, where courts determine that dismissal with
prejudice pursuant to compulsory-reply local rules is appropriate, district
courts should conduct an independent merits analysis of the complaint to
ensure that the movant met its Rule 12(b)(6) burden of proof. Second, district
courts may grant 12(b)(6) motions as unopposed pursuant to
compulsory-reply local rules without conducting an independent merits
analysis only when granted without prejudice. Because dismissal without
prejudice allows parties to file a new complaint in the same court,182 the
second option balances courts’ need for effective docket management tools
and Rule 83(a)(1)’s consistency requirements.183 For this second option,
courts might consider exceptions for certain factors like those that the Fifth
and D.C. Circuits have cited in the context of granting motions to dismiss for
lack of response, such as lack of bad faith, short delay, absence of prejudice
to the defendant, and efforts to respond.184 Courts can implement this Note’s
solution either by adopting the model local rule this Note proposes or by
reinterpreting the text of their existing compulsory-reply local rules to
implicitly adopt the solution. Rather than the incompatible array of
approaches courts currently take on this issue,185 this bifurcated approach
provides litigants with one consistent set of expectations.
In the following sections, this Note elaborates on this proposed bifurcated
solution, demonstrates its compliance with current law, and shows why it
effectively addresses relevant policy concerns. Part III.A explains the
dismissal-with-prejudice option of the solution, focusing on the independent
merits analysis requirement and explaining why dismissal with prejudice
solely for lack of opposition violates Rule 83(a)(1) and the Rules Enabling
Act. Part III.B describes the dismissal-without-prejudice option and explains
why it fulfills necessary docket management functions. Finally, Part III.C
demonstrates how courts can implement this solution either by adopting a
new model local rule or by reinterpreting existing compulsory-reply local
rules. Second, Part III.C illustrates how the bifurcated approach would work
in practice by applying it to Webb v. Morella.186

182. See Semtek Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 505 (2001) (“The
primary meaning of ‘dismissal without prejudice,’ we think, is dismissal without barring the
plaintiff from returning later, to the same court, with the same underlying claim.” (quoting
FED. R. CIV. P. 41)).
183. See supra Part I.A.
184. See Boazman v. Econ. Lab’y, Inc., 537 F.2d 210, 212 (5th Cir. 1976); see also Cohen,
819 F.3d at 484.
185. See supra Part II.
186. No. 10-cv-01557, slip op. (W.D. La. Jan. 24, 2011), rev’d, 457 F. App’x 448
(5th Cir. 2012).
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A. Dismissal with Prejudice: District Courts Conduct Independent Merits
Analysis
The first component of the bifurcated approach applies when district courts
determine that dismissal with prejudice pursuant to a compulsory-reply local
rule is an appropriate option. After making this determination, district courts
should not automatically dismiss the 12(b)(6) motion but should instead
conduct an independent merits analysis of the complaint to ensure that the
movant met its Rule 12(b)(6) burden of proof. Multiple circuit courts already
demand that district courts analyze the complaint’s underlying merits before
dismissing a 12(b)(6) motion.187 For instance, the Third, Seventh, Sixth,
Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits, in overturning dismissals pursuant to
compulsory-reply local rules solely for lack of response, have required that
courts dismiss unopposed 12(b)(6) motions only after conducting an
independent analysis of the merits.188 The Seventh and Tenth Circuits have
explicitly stated that courts may rule on unopposed 12(b)(6) motions by
looking to the complaint itself to determine the sufficiency of the
pleadings.189 Since the imposition of this requirement, district courts in these
circuits have ruled on unopposed 12(b)(6) motions by conducting merits
analyses through looking to the complaint itself to determine if movants met
their burden of proof.190 Part III.A.1 first describes the procedure courts
should follow when conducting the independent merits analysis. Then, Part
III.A.2 explains why the independent merits analysis ensures that
compulsory-reply local rules comply with Rule 83(a)(1) and the Rules
Enabling Act.

187. See Marcure v. Lynn, 992 F.3d 625, 632 (7th Cir. 2021) (“[C]ourts may rule on an
unopposed Rule 12(b)(6) motion by reaching the merits rather than granting it on the basis
that it is unopposed.”); Giummo v. Olsen, 701 F. App’x 922, 925 (11th Cir. 2017); Issa v.
Comp USA, 354 F.3d 1174, 1177 (10th Cir. 2003) (“[E]ven if a plaintiff does not file a
response to a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the district court must still examine
the allegations in the plaintiff’s complaint and determine whether the plaintiff has stated a
claim upon which relief can be granted.”); Stackhouse v. Mazurkiewicz, 951 F.2d 29, 30
(3d Cir. 1991) (“[T]he complaint should in the first instance be considered substantively by
the district court.”); Carver v. Bunch, 946 F.2d 451, 455 (6th Cir. 1991) (requiring the district
court “to examine the movant’s motion . . . to ensure that he has discharged that burden”).
188. See cases cited supra note 187.
189. See Marcure, 992 F.3d at 633 n.5 (“Courts remain free to rule on Rule 12(b)(6)
motions even absent a response by looking to the complaint itself to determine the sufficiency
of the pleadings.”); see also Issa v. Comp USA, 354 F.3d 1174, 1178 (10th Cir. 2003).
190. See, e.g., Hendrick v. Bryant, No. 20-cv-00249, 2021 WL 4502159, at *6 (N.D. Ill.
Sept. 30, 2021) (“But even when a plaintiff does not respond to an argument made by a
defendant in a motion to dismiss, the defendant still carries the burden of persuasion and a
court may not dismiss a claim based only on the plaintiff’s failure to respond.”); Banks v.
LoanCare LLC, No. 18 C 03358, 2021 WL 4192067, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 15, 2021) (“Where
the plaintiff fails to respond to a motion to dismiss, as is the case here, the Court must still find
the defendant entitled to relief under Rule 12(b)(6) . . . . [T]he Court will look to the complaint
to test the sufficiency of the pleadings.” (citing Marcure v. Lynn, 992 F.3d 625, 633 (7th Cir.
2021))); Hall v. Cox, No. 18-CV-01056, 2019 WL 3736711, at *3 (D. Colo. July 10, 2019),
report and recommendation adopted, No. 18-cv-01056, 2019 WL 3733593 (D. Colo. Aug. 7,
2019).
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1. Procedure for Rule 12(b)(6)’s Independent Merits Analysis
When courts determine that dismissal with prejudice pursuant to a
compulsory-reply local rule is warranted, district courts should then conduct
an independent merits analysis of the complaint to ensure that the movant
met its Rule 12(b)(6) burden of proof. Multiple circuit courts have already
read into their compulsory-reply local rules a requirement that district courts
conduct an independent merits analysis for dismissal pursuant to a
compulsory-reply local rule,191 and district courts have complied with these
requirements by looking to the complaint.192 By following those circuit
courts’ lead,193 district courts can grant Rule 12(b)(6) motions with
prejudice, even when the nonmovant fails to reply as required by local rule,
if they determine that a movant has met its burden of proof.
For the independent merits analysis, district courts should test the
complaint according to Rule 12(b)(6)’s typical analytical procedure.194 The
court should make this determination by looking to the 12(b)(6) motion and
to the complaint itself to determine the sufficiency of the pleadings.195 Once
the court receives the complaint, the motion to dismiss, and corresponding
memorandum of law, the court should conduct 12(b)(6)’s two-part
analysis.196 The district court should first read the movant’s motion, separate
the factual and legal elements of the claim, accept all well-pleaded facts as
true, and disregard any legal conclusions.197 Then, the court should
determine whether the alleged facts are sufficient to show the plaintiff has a
plausible claim for relief, drawing on both the context of the complaint and
the court’s own “experience and common sense.”198 As part of this process,
the court may also consider documents attached to the complaint as exhibits
or incorporated by reference into the complaint.199
Implementing this requirement when courts want to dismiss with prejudice
would bring compulsory-reply local rules in line with Rule 83(a)(1)’s
consistency requirement.200 Before a district court could dismiss pursuant to
a compulsory-reply local rule for lack of response, courts would ensure that
Rule 12(b)(6) movants meet their burden of proof as Rule 12(b)(6)
requires.201 This innovative approach addresses the D.C. Circuit’s concern
that compulsory-reply local rules effectively place the burden of proof on the
nonmoving party202 because the nonmoving party would never lose if the
191. See cases cited supra note 187.
192. See cases cited supra note 190.
193. See cases cited supra note 190.
194. See supra Part I.B.
195. See Marcure v. Lynn, 992 F.3d 625, 633 n.5 (7th Cir. 2021); Issa v. Comp USA, 354
F.3d 1174, 1178 (10th Cir. 2003).
196. See Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210–11 (3d Cir. 2009).
197. See id.
198. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009).
199. See Rothman v. Gregor, 220 F.3d 81, 88 (2d Cir. 2000).
200. FED. R. CIV. P. 83(a)(1).
201. See Marcure v. Lynn, 992 F.3d 625, 631 (7th Cir. 2021).
202. See supra Part II.C.

1802

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 90

movant could not meet the burden of proof. Even if the nonmovant does not
respond, the court will not automatically grant the movant’s motion to
dismiss with prejudice solely due to lack of response.
Since the Seventh Circuit adopted a similar approach in Marcure v. Lynn
in March 2021,203 one district court in the circuit has already conducted its
own independent merits analysis to dismiss an unopposed 12(b)(6) motion
with prejudice.204 In Banks v. LoanCare LLC,205 a federal district court in
the Northern District of Illinois cited to Marcure for the proposition that,
although the plaintiff failed to reply, the court was still required to find the
defendant entitled to relief under Rule 12(b)(6).206 To conduct this analysis
in the absence of the compulsory brief, the district court looked to the
complaint itself to test the sufficiency of the pleadings.207 In conducting the
analysis, the court addressed all three of the plaintiffs’ claims.208 The court
identified the legal elements of each claim and then determined whether the
plaintiff pleaded sufficient facts in the complaint to meet each element.209
However, the court found that the plaintiffs had failed to plead “any
cognizable theory to support their claims” in the complaint.210 Ultimately,
the court dismissed the plaintiffs’ claim with prejudice because the court had
previously dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims two times prior.211 Banks
demonstrates that an independent merits analysis requirement for dismissal
with prejudice can be easily adopted by courts. Other district courts can
model the Northern District of Illinois’s analysis in this case when
conducting their own independent merits analyses for dismissal with
prejudice pursuant to compulsory-reply local rule.
2. Dismissal with Prejudice Solely for Lack of Opposition Violates Rule
83(a)(1) and the Rules Enabling Act
In addition to the independent merits analysis, this Note contends that any
reading of compulsory-reply local rules that empowers district courts to
dismiss 12(b)(6) motions with prejudice solely for lack of response is invalid
under Rule 83(a)(1) and the Rules Enabling Act. This interpretation conflicts
with the movant’s 12(b)(6) burden of proof because it allows courts to
dismiss without considering whether the movant met the burden of proof.212
This interpretation is particularly problematic when dismissing with
prejudice because the nonmovant would not be able to file a new complaint

203. Marcure, 992 F.3d at 631.
204. See Banks v. LoanCare LLC, No. 18 C 03358, 2021 WL 4192067, at *3 (N.D. Ill.
Sept. 15, 2021).
205. No. 18 C 03358, 2021 WL 4192067 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 15, 2021).
206. See id. at *3.
207. See id.
208. See id. at *4–14.
209. See id.
210. See id. at *15.
211. See id.
212. See cases cited supra note 11.
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in the same court.213 Because courts are allowed to conclusively end the
litigation without considering the Rule 12(b)(6) movant’s burden,214 Rule
12(b)(6) and this interpretation of the local rules are not “consistent” as
required by Rule 83(a)(1).215
This interpretation of compulsory-reply local rules also conflicts with the
Rule 83(a)(1) consistency requirement set forth by the Supreme Court in
Miner and Colgrove.216 Although that standard is admittedly vague, this
reading still fulfills Miner’s “basic procedural innovation” and Colgrove’s
“aspects of the litigatory process which bear upon the ultimate outcome of
the litigation” language.217 Like the local rule overturned in Miner,218 this
interpretation of compulsory-reply local rules is “substantive” and “basic”
because it permits a district court to dismiss the complaint whether or not the
movant fulfilled the burden of proof, even though Rule 12(b)(6) imposes this
burden on the movant, without a chance for the plaintiff to file a new
complaint in the same court. Further, dismissal with prejudice under
compulsory-reply local rules fits within the literal language of Colgrove’s
standard because it bears directly on the “ultimate outcome of the
litigation.”219 Unlike the local rule upheld in Colgrove,220 dismissal with
prejudice under compulsory-reply local rules makes a “discernible
difference” on the outcome of the litigation because it ends the litigation in
that court.221 Accordingly, any reading of compulsory-reply local rules that
permits dismissal with prejudice solely for lack of response is not permissible
under Rule 83(a)(1) and should not be upheld by courts.
Likewise, dismissal with prejudice solely for lack of response violates the
Rules Enabling Act.222 While the Rules Enabling Act empowers district
courts to adopt local rules,223 it also requires that the local rules be consistent
with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.224 Thus, because of this
requirement,225 district courts’ compulsory-reply local rules must comply
with Rule 12(b)(6). As discussed, courts’ use of compulsory-reply local rules
to dismiss with prejudice solely for lack of response is inconsistent with Rule
12(b)(6).226 This, in turn, violates the Rules Enabling Act’s consistency
requirement. Further, the Rules Enabling Act bars the Federal Rules of Civil

213. See 9 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 5, § 2373 (“[A] Rule 41(b) dismissal on the merits
for one of the grounds stated in that provision only necessarily bars a plaintiff from refiling
the same claim in the same federal court, but not in other courts.”).
214. See Marcure v. Lynn, 992 F.3d 625, 631 (7th Cir. 2021).
215. FED. R. CIV. P. 83(a)(1).
216. See supra Part I.A.
217. See supra Part I.A.
218. See Miner v. Atlass, 363 U.S. 641, 649–50 (1960).
219. See Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149, 164 n.23 (1973).
220. See id. at 159–60.
221. See Semtek Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 506 (2001).
222. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071–2077.
223. See id. § 2071.
224. See id.
225. Id.
226. See Part II.A.2.
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Procedure from abridging, enlarging, or modifying any substantive right.227
Because district courts also derive their rulemaking authority from Rule
83(a)(1),228 local rules should not be able to abridge, enlarge, or modify any
substantive right either. Dismissal with prejudice solely for lack of reply
impermissibly abridges and modifies nonmovants’ rights under Rule
12(b)(6) because, if the nonmovant fails to reply, the nonmovant’s complaint
could be dismissed even if the movant failed to meet the 12(b)(6) burden of
proof.229 For these reasons, dismissal of an unopposed 12(b)(6) motion with
prejudice without a merits analysis violates the Rules Enabling Act in
addition to Rule 83(a)(1), and courts must abandon the practice.
B. Dismissal Without Prejudice: Courts May Dismiss Solely Because of
Lack of Response
This section will explain the process district courts should follow when
dismissing a 12(b)(6) motion without prejudice pursuant to a
compulsory-reply local rule. Under this dismissal-without-prejudice option,
courts may grant unopposed 12(b)(6) motions pursuant to compulsory-reply
local rules without conducting an analysis on the merits only when they grant
such motions without prejudice, with certain exceptions up to the courts’
discretion. Unlike a reading of compulsory-reply local rules that allows a
12(b)(6) motion dismissal with prejudice, a reading that allows a dismissal
without prejudice would not be offensive to the Supreme Court’s Rule
83(a)(1) consistency standard because it would not be an aspect “of the
litigatory process which bear[s] upon the ultimate outcome of the
litigation.”230 Dismissal without prejudice does not “bear upon the ultimate
outcome of the litigation” because, unlike dismissal with prejudice, it allows
parties to retry their case in the same court by filing a new complaint.231
Here, parties would not be conclusively barred from trying their claim again,
and the “ultimate outcome” could be determined in a future case.232 Further,
if the parties decide to file their claim again, the same court may still
ultimately decide their case on the merits.233
This second component of the bifurcated solution would allow courts the
discretion to make exceptions in certain scenarios. Under these exceptions,
courts could still require movants to prove the merits of their motions even
when the court intends to dismiss without prejudice. Here, the court has
discretion to consider factors like those that the Fifth and D.C. Circuits have
cited in the context of granting motions to dismiss for lack of response, such
as plaintiffs’ lack of bad faith, short delay, absence of prejudice to the

227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.

See 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b).
FED. R. CIV. P. 83(a)(1).
See supra Part I.B.
See Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149, 164 n.23 (1973).
See 9 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 5, § 2373.
See id.
See id.
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defendant, and efforts to respond.234 Therefore, if plaintiffs do not
demonstrate “egregious” behavior or lack of respect for court deadlines,235
courts would be able to provide this extra measure of protection on a
case-by-case basis. Providing exceptions in these scenarios gives courts the
discretion to effectively manage their dockets as they see fit according to
local needs and varying litigant circumstances.
Courts should adopt this option of the solution instead of the majority’s
categorical rule against dismissal solely for lack of response,236 because it
balances district courts’ docket management needs237 with the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure’s policy preference for decisions on the merits.238 District
courts must retain the ability to dismiss unopposed motions without prejudice
because judges need effective tools to be able to manage their heavy
caseloads.239 Especially with the complexity and number of federal cases
rising and discovery and documentation becoming more extensive, judges
need local rules to provide quick answers to trial lawyers, to meet daily needs,
and to promote uniformity.240 The purpose of Rule 12(b)(6) itself is to
empower courts to throw out fatally flawed suits and, in doing so, to save
both parties and the court from further unnecessary litigation.241 As the D.C.
Circuit noted regarding D.C. Rule 7(b), compulsory-reply local rules can
often serve as docket management tools, facilitating the “efficient and
effective resolution of motions.”242 Still, the court would never dismiss a
nonmoving party’s claims with prejudice—thus preventing the nonmoving
party from trying the case again in the same court by filing a new
complaint—without an analysis of underlying merits of the motion to
dismiss. Therefore, this solution would respect the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure’s preference for decisions on the merits243 because nonmovants
could always retry their case in the same court.
C. Implementing the Moderate Solution
Courts may implement this Note’s bifurcated solution either by adopting
a new model local rule or by reinterpreting their existing compulsory-reply
local rules. Both implementation options accomplish the underlying goal of
234. See Boazman v. Econ. Lab’y, Inc., 537 F.2d 210, 212 (5th Cir. 1976); see also Cohen
v. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of D.C., 819 F.3d 476, 484 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
235. See supra Part I.B.
236. See supra Part II.A.
237. See supra Part I.A.
238. See Krupski v. Costa Crociere S. p. A., 560 U.S. 538, 550 (2010) (explaining that the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have a general preference for resolution of disputes on the
merits).
239. See Coquillette et al., supra note 44, at 65 (“The Federal Rules are general and
permissive. Busy trial judges need more specificity to meet daily problems and provide
uniformity and predictability within their districts.”).
240. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
241. See Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc. v. Scimed Life Sys., Inc., 988 F.2d 1157,
1160 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
242. See Fox v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 389 F.3d 1291, 1294 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
243. See Krupski, 560 U.S. at 550.
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ensuring clarity and uniformity for litigants and courts and conformity with
Rule 83(a)(1) and the Rules Enabling Act. Moreover, district courts would
have discretion to choose which implementation option is more appropriate
for their courts. In the following sections, this Note presents a model local
rule that courts may adopt, details an interpretation of existing
compulsory-reply local rules to include the solution, and demonstrates how
this solution would work in practice.
1. Option One: Courts Should Adopt a Model Local Rule
Courts can implement this Note’s solution by enacting the model rule
detailed below. District courts have the power to adopt new local rules
pursuant to the Rules Enabling Act and Rule 83(a)(1).244 Unlike existing
compulsory-reply local rules,245 this Note’s model rule explicitly defines
when, and under what conditions, a judge may grant a 12(b)(6) motion with
or without prejudice. The model rule, like existing compulsory-reply local
rules,246 still requires the nonmovant to file a reply within a set number of
days. However, the model rule clarifies what dismissal options the judge
may choose from, pursuant to this Note’s bifurcated solution, if the
nonmovant fails to meet the reply requirement. As such, courts should adopt
the following rule:
Within fourteen days of the date of service or at such other time as the court
may direct, an opposing party shall serve and file a memorandum of points
and authorities in opposition to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. If no
response is timely filed, the court may grant the 12(b)(6) motion and
dismiss the complaint without prejudice on the sole basis that the opposing
party failed to reply. The court may grant the motion with prejudice only
after determining that the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted.

Courts should consider adopting this model rule and abandoning their
current compulsory-reply local rules because many existing
compulsory-reply local rules are inconsistent and unclear.247 The text and
phrasing of compulsory-reply local rules vary significantly from district to
district.248 Further, as demonstrated by the existing circuit split they
underlie,249 many compulsory-reply local rules are ambiguous and fail to
state exactly what authority or discretion they purport to grant to the district
judge.250 Additionally, most compulsory-reply local rules ignore the
12(b)(6) movant’s burden of proof to show that the complaint failed to state
244. 28 U.S.C. § 2071; FED. R. CIV. P. 83(a)(1).
245. See Appendix.
246. See id.
247. See id.; see also A. Leo Levin, Local Rules as Experiments: A Study in the Division
of Power, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1567, 1569 (1991) (calling for local rules’ uniformity and
consistency with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure); Roberts, supra note 42, at 540
(advocating for the “integrity and uniformity” of local rules).
248. See Appendix.
249. See supra Part II.
250. See Appendix.
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a claim, both textually and conceptually.251 The failure of federal courts to
conclusively and uniformly determine what compulsory-reply local rules
permit252 demonstrates the current rules’ textual insufficiency.
Unlike existing compulsory-reply local rules, the model rule defines the
authority granted to the judge, designates the requirements for dismissal with
or without prejudice, and addresses the movant’s 12(b)(6) burden of proof.
Because of those features, parties and judges alike would know exactly what
the rule requires of them, and the consequences of failure to comply, simply
from reading the rule itself. Thus, in the interests of federal uniformity and
legal clarity,253 district courts should adopt this Note’s model local rule.
2. Option Two: Courts Should Update Interpretation of Existing
Compulsory-Reply Local Rules
Courts may also adopt this solution by reinterpreting ambiguous
compulsory-reply local rules. Even though most compulsory-reply local
rules seemingly impose similar requirements on litigants,254 courts have
come to a variety of different conclusions regarding what these local rules
permit.255 This array of interpretations256 is evidence that compulsory-reply
local rules are ambiguous regarding their proper reading, function, and
interaction with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Thus, the ambiguous
text of these local rules already provides a reasonable and effective vehicle
for implementation. Multiple circuit courts have independently read merits
analysis requirements into their own district courts’ ambiguous local rules,257
and courts may use similar interpretive means to implement this Note’s
proposed solution.
For example, the Seventh Circuit read a merits analysis requirement into
Central District of Illinois Local Rule 7.1(B)(2)258 itself.259 In interpreting
Local Rule 7.1(B)(2) to include a merits analysis requirement, the Seventh
Circuit first held that Local Rule 7.1(B)(2)’s text did not expressly permit a
court to grant a 12(b)(6) motion solely for lack of opposition.260 Instead, the
Seventh Circuit found that Local Rule 7.1(B)(2) only empowered the district
court to assume no opposition and rule without further notice if a party failed
to respond to the 12(b)(6) motion.261 However, in its ruling, the district court
was still required to reach the merits by looking to the complaint itself and
251. See id.
252. See supra Part II.
253. See Levin, supra note 247, at 1569; Roberts, supra note 42, at 540.
254. See Appendix.
255. See supra Part II.
256. See supra Part II.
257. See cases cited supra note 187.
258. C.D. ILL. R. 7.1(B)(2).
259. See Marcure v. Lynn, 992 F.3d 625, 632 (7th Cir. 2021). As previously discussed,
Local Rule 7.1(B)(2) provides that “[a]ny party opposing a motion . . . must file a response to
the motion . . . . If no response is timely filed, the presiding judge will presume there is no
opposition to the motion and rule without further notice to the parties.” C.D. ILL. R. 7.1(B)(2).
260. See Marcure, 992 F.3d at 632.
261. See id.
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could not dismiss solely for lack of opposition.262 Courts could mirror the
interpretive techniques that the Seventh Circuit applied to Local Rule
7.1(B)(2) and interpret their existing compulsory-reply local rules to include
this Note’s bifurcated solution.
3. Webb v. Morella: The Solution in Practice
To further illustrate how this proposition would work in practice, consider
the plaintiffs, Belva and Faith Webb, from the district court case, Webb v.
Morella, discussed earlier.263 A federal district court in the Western District
of Louisiana dismissed the Webbs’ complaint with prejudice under its Local
Rule 7.5 because the Webbs filed their response to the defendant’s 12(b)(6)
motion one day late and without a table of contents or table of authorities.264
In so doing, the court did not consider the merits of the defendant’s motion
or the plaintiffs’ complaint and day-late response.265
First, consider how the district court could interpret its existing Local Rule
7.5 to include the solution. Local Rule 7.5 requires that if the nonmovant
opposes a 12(b)(6) motion, the nonmovant “shall file a response, including
opposing affidavits, memorandum, and such supporting documents as are
then available, within twenty-one days after service of the motion.”266
Although the district court interpreted this rule to allow for dismissal with
prejudice solely for lack of response,267 the text of the rule does not
necessarily permit, or prevent, the district court’s reading.268 The language
of Local Rule 7.5 is thus unclear as to whether a judge may dismiss on the
basis that the plaintiffs failed to file the response by the deadline, and the
language says nothing about whether the court may grant the motion with or
without prejudice.269 Therefore, the rule is open to interpretation, and the
district court should modify its interpretative approach to incorporate this
Note’s proposal. Alternatively, because of the ambiguity and vagueness in
Local Rule 7.5, the district court may also consider replacing the rule with
this Note’s proposed model local rule.270 Regardless of whether the district
court proceeds by adopting the proposed model rule or by reinterpreting the
existing local rule, the next procedural and analytical steps will be the same.
Under this Note’s solution, after the defendant submitted the motion to
dismiss and corresponding memorandum of law, the district court would first

262. See id. at 633 n.5 (“Our holding does not render district courts powerless to dispose
of motions to dismiss in the face of inactive plaintiffs. Courts remain free to rule on Rule
12(b)(6) motions even absent a response by looking to the complaint itself to determine the
sufficiency of the pleadings.”).
263. See supra notes 1–9 and accompanying text.
264. See Webb v. Morella, No. 10-cv-01557, slip op. at 2 (W.D. La. Jan. 24, 2011), rev’d,
457 F. App’x 448 (5th Cir. 2012).
265. See id.
266. W.D. LA. R. 7.5.
267. See Webb, No. 10-cv-01557, slip op. at 2.
268. See W.D. LA. R. 7.5.
269. See id.
270. See supra Part III.C.1.
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determine, in its discretion, whether to dismiss the plaintiffs’ claim with or
without prejudice. If the court had determined that, under Local Rule 7.5, it
could grant the defendant’s 12(b)(6) motion with prejudice, it would have
then conducted an independent analysis of defendant’s motion on the merits,
even if the plaintiffs failed to respond.271 Despite not having additional
filings from the plaintiffs, the court would have ruled on the motion by
looking to the 12(b)(6) motion and the complaint itself to determine the
sufficiency of the pleadings.272 On the other hand, if the court determined
that, under Local Rule 7.5, it may dismiss without prejudice, the court would
have dismissed solely for the plantiffs’ failure to respond to the defendant’s
motion.273 Here though, the court may still want to consider an exception
because of the plaintiffs’ clear efforts to comply with the rule, as evidenced
by the fact that they filed a response one day later.274
Regardless of the route the court decides to adopt, Local Rule 7.5 or the
model rule discussed above will still comply with Rule 83(a)(1) and the Rules
Enabling Act because the court could not dismiss the plaintiffs’ claim with
prejudice, and thus conclusively bar the plaintiffs from filing another
complaint in the same court, without holding the movant to the Rule 12(b)(6)
burden of proof.275 Importantly, the district court would also retain the
flexibility necessary to dismiss without prejudice for docket management
purposes.276 Further, the plaintiffs and the district court alike would have a
clear and uniform set of expectations when dealing with responses to 12(b)(6)
motions to dismiss.
CONCLUSION
Federal courts disagree on whether district courts have the legal authority
to grant 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss solely for lack of reply pursuant to
compulsory-reply local rules. This Note proposes a bifurcated solution—
implemented either by adopting a model local rule or by reinterpreting
current compulsory-reply local rules—that attempts to resolve the current
dispute among the federal district courts. This Note proposes that district
courts may grant 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss solely for lack of response
pursuant to compulsory-reply local rule only when dismissed without
prejudice. However, when dismissing with prejudice, this Note asserts that
courts must conduct an analysis of the underlying merits.
Ultimately, if this solution is widely adopted, compulsory-reply local rules
would be brought into compliance with Rule 83(a)(1) and the Rules Enabling
Act. Further, although district courts would retain the discretion necessary
to effectively manage their dockets, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure’s

271. See supra Part III.A.1.
272. Marcure v. Lynn, 992 F.3d 625, 633 n.5 (7th Cir. 2021).
273. See supra Part III.B.
274. See Boazman v. Econ. Lab’y, Inc., 537 F.2d 210, 212 (5th Cir. 1976); see also
Cohen v. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of D.C., 819 F.3d 476, 484 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
275. See supra Part III.A.2.
276. See supra Part III.B.
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preference for decisions on the merits would be respected. Most importantly,
litigants and courts alike would have one uniform and predictable set of
expectations when a party fails to respond to a 12(b)(6) motion as required
by a local rule.
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APPENDIX: COMPULSORY-REPLY LOCAL RULES
District Court
Local Rule
D. ME. R. 7(b)

D.N.H. R. 7.1(b)

D. MASS. R.
7.1(b)(2)

D.P.R. R. 7(b)

E.D. PA. R. 7.1(c)

M.D. PA. R. 7.6

Text of Rule
First Circuit
“Unless within 21 days after the filing of a motion
the opposing party files written objection thereto,
incorporating a memorandum of law, the opposing
party shall be deemed to have waived objection.”
“Except as otherwise required by law or order of the
court, every objection, except objections to
summary judgment motions, shall be filed within
fourteen (14) days from the date the motion is
filed . . . . The court shall deem waived any
objection not filed in accordance with this rule.”
“A party opposing a motion shall file an opposition
within 14 days after the motion is served . . . . A
party opposing a motion shall file in the same (rather
than a separate) document a memorandum of
reasons, including citation of supporting authorities,
why the motion should not be granted. Affidavits
and other documents setting forth or evidencing
facts on which the opposition is based shall be filed
with the opposition.”
“Unless within fourteen (14) days after the service
of a motion the opposing party files a written
opposition to the motion, the opposing party shall
be deemed to have waived any objection to the
motion.”
Third Circuit
“Unless the Court directs otherwise, any party
opposing the motion shall serve a brief in opposition
together with such answer or other response that
may be appropriate, within fourteen (14) days after
service of the motion and supporting brief. In the
absence of timely response, the motion may be
granted as uncontested except as provided under
Fed.R.Civ.P 56.”
“Any party opposing any motion, other than a
motion for summary judgment, shall file a brief in
opposition within fourteen (14) days after service of
the movant’s brief, or, if a brief in support of the
motion is not required under these rules, within
seven (7) days after service of the motion. Any
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party who fails to comply with this rule shall be
deemed not to oppose such motion.”
Fifth Circuit
M.D. LA. R. 7(f)
“Each respondent opposing a motion shall file a
response, including opposing affidavits, and such
supporting documents as are then available, within
twenty-one days after service of the motion.
Memoranda shall contain a concise statement of
reasons in opposition to the motion, and a citation
of authorities upon which the respondent relies.”
W.D. LA. R. 7.5
“If the respondent opposes a motion, he or she shall
file a response, including opposing affidavits,
memorandum, and such supporting documents as
are then available, within 21 days after service of the
motion. Memoranda shall contain a concise
statement of reasons in opposition to the motion,
and a citation of authorities upon which respondent
relies.”
E.D. LA. R. 7.5
“Each party opposing a motion must file and serve
a memorandum in opposition to the motion with
citations of authorities no later than eight days
before the noticed submission date.”
Sixth Circuit
S.D. OHIO R. 7.2(2) “Any memorandum in opposition shall be filed
within twenty-one days after the date of service of
the motion. Failure to file a memorandum in
opposition may result in the granting of any motion
that would not result directly in entry of final
judgment or an award of attorneys’ fees.”
E.D. & W.D. KY.
“Unless otherwise ordered by the Court, a party
R. 7.1(c)
opposing a motion must file a response within 21
days of service of the motion. Failure to timely
respond to a motion may be grounds for granting the
motion.”
M.D. TENN. R.
“If a timely response is not filed, the motion shall be
7.01(a)(3)
deemed to be unopposed . . . .”
E.D. TENN. R. 7.2
“Failure to respond to a motion may be deemed a
waiver of any opposition to the relief sought.”
Seventh Circuit
S.D. IND. R.
“The court may summarily rule on a motion if an
7.1(c)(5)
opposing party does not file a response within the
deadline.”
E.D. WIS. R. 7(d)
“Failure to file a memorandum in opposition to a
motion is sufficient cause for the Court to grant the
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C.D. ILL. R.
7.1(B)(2)

S.D. ILL. R. 7.1(c)

D.N.D. R. 7.1(F)

E.D. ARK. & W.D.
ARK. R. 7.2(b)

N.D. IOWA & S.D.
IOWA R. 7(f)
D. IDAHO R.
7.1(e)(1)
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motion. The Court also may impose sanctions under
General L. R. 83(f).”
“Any party opposing a motion filed pursuant to
(B)(1) must file a response to the motion, including
a brief statement of the specific points or
propositions of law and supporting authorities upon
which the responding party relies. The response
must be filed within 14 days after service of the
motion and memorandum. If no response is timely
filed, the presiding judge will presume there is no
opposition to the motion and may rule without
further notice to the parties.”
“Failure to timely file a response to a motion may,
in the Court’s discretion, be considered an
admission of the merits of the motion.”
Eighth Circuit
“A party’s failure to serve and file a memorandum
or a response within the prescribed time may subject
a motion to summary ruling. A moving party’s
failure to serve and file a memorandum in support
may be deemed an admission that the motion is
without merit. An adverse party’s failure to serve
and file a response to a motion may be deemed an
admission that the motion is well taken.”
“Within fourteen (14) days from the date of service
of copies of a motion and supporting papers, any
party opposing a motion shall serve and file with the
Clerk a concise statement in opposition to the
motion with supporting authorities.”
“If no timely resistance to a motion is filed, the
motion may be granted without notice.”
Ninth Circuit
“Failure by the moving party to file any documents
required to be filed under this rule in a timely
manner may be deemed a waiver by the moving
party of the pleading or motion. Except as provided
in subpart (2) below, if an adverse party fails to
timely file any response documents required to be
filed under this rule, such failure may be deemed to
constitute a consent to the sustaining of said
pleading or the granting of said motion or other
application. In addition, the Court, upon motion or
its own initiative, may impose sanctions in the form
of reasonable expenses incurred, including attorney
fees, upon the adverse party and/or counsel for
failure to comply with this rule.”

1814
W.D. WASH. R.
7(b)(2)
D. NEV. R. 7-2.(d)

E.D. CAL. R.
230(c)

E.D. OKLA. R.
7.1(g)

D.N.M. R. 7.1(b)

M.D. FLA. R.
3.01(c)
S.D. GA. R. 7.5

S.D. FLA. R.
7.1(c)(1)
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“Except for motions for summary judgment, if a
party fails to file papers in opposition to a motion,
such failure may be considered by the court as an
admission that the motion has merit.”
“The failure of a moving party to file points and
authorities in support of the motion constitutes a
consent to the denial of the motion. The failure of
an opposing party to file points and authorities in
response to any motion, except a motion under Fed.
R. Civ. P. 56 or a motion for attorney’s fees,
constitutes a consent to the granting of the motion.”
“Opposition, if any, to the granting of the motion
shall be in writing and shall be filed and served not
less than fourteen (14) days preceding the noticed
(or continued) hearing date . . . . A failure to file a
timely opposition may also be construed by the
Court as a non-opposition to the motion.”
Tenth Circuit
“If a dispositive motion is not opposed, the Court
may in its discretion provide an additional fourteen
(14) days for the opposing party to show cause why
the motion should not be granted, after which the
case will be dismissed or the motion will be deemed
confessed, as appropriate.”
“The failure of a party to file and serve a response
in opposition to a motion within the time prescribed
for doing so constitutes consent to grant the
motion.”
Eleventh Circuit
“If a party fails to timely respond, the motion is
subject to treatment as unopposed.”
“Unless these rules or the assigned Judge prescribes
otherwise, each party opposing a motion shall serve
and file a response within fourteen (14) days of
service of the motion . . . . Failure to respond within
the applicable time period shall indicate that there is
no opposition to a motion.”
“For all motions, except motions served with the
summons and complaint, each party opposing a
motion shall file and serve an opposing
memorandum of law no later than fourteen (14)
days after service of the motion. Failure to do so
may be deemed sufficient cause for granting the
motion by default.”
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“Any party opposing a motion shall serve the
party’s response, responsive memorandum,
affidavits, and any other responsive material not
later than fourteen (14) days after service of the
motion . . . . Failure to file a response shall indicate
that there is no opposition to the motion.”
District of Columbia Circuit
“Within 14 days of the date of service or at such
other time as the Court may direct, an opposing
party shall serve and file a memorandum of points
and authorities in opposition to the motion. If such
a memorandum is not filed within the prescribed
time, the Court may treat the motion as conceded.”

